American and Israeli strikes have done clear damage, but uncertainties remain about what has survived
Image: Getty Images
)
After America’s strikes on Iran on June 22nd, Donald Trump claimed that the country’s key nuclear facilities were “totally obliterated”. Other American officials were more cautious, noting that it would take time to assess the damage. Leaked preliminary intelligence reports suggest the attacks, which included the first use in battle of the GBU-57, America’s largest bunker-buster bomb, put Iran’s nuclear programme back by only a few months. The White House rejects the claims: on June 26th Pete Hegseth, America’s defence secretary, said the raid was “historically successful”, though he gave few details about the damage it inflicted. There is particular uncertainty about the amount of highly enriched uranium (HEU) Iran retains. Mapping Iran’s nuclear facilities gives a sense of the damage and how the country’s programme could endure.
Iran's nuclear facilities
Iran’s nuclear programme is distributed among several sites around the country, to make it harder to attack and disrupt.
The country has domestic sources of uranium. Its largest mine is at Saghand, in east-central Iran. But mined uranium is mostly the wrong type for nuclear weapons: it is over 99% uranium-238 (U-238; the number refers to the mass of each atom). Bombs require its lighter cousin, uranium-235 (U-235), which makes up just 0.7% of natural uranium.
To get at the lighter uranium, the metal is converted into a gas, uranium hexafluoride, and spun in centrifuges at extremely high speeds. The heavier U-238 tends to move to the outside, making the gas at the centre slightly richer in U-235. If this process is repeated many times, the concentration of U-235 can be raised as high as 90%, creating weapons-grade uranium.
Image: Planet Labs
The Natanz enrichment plant was Iran’s largest. An underground hall held around 18,400 centrifuges, according to the Institute for Science and International Security, a think-tank. The site also housed an above-ground centrifuge-research facility.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the UN’s nuclear watchdog, said Israeli strikes probably caused significant damage to centrifuges in Natanz’s underground facility by taking out their power supply. America also dropped two GBU-57s on the buried part of the site.
Image: Maxar
The underground enrichment facility at Fordow was the main target of the American attack. Its centrifuges, though fewer in number than Natanz, were newer and more robust. The most sensitive parts of the site were thought to be buried deep under the mountainside. Media reports suggest the American strikes badly damaged the facility’s electricity supply.
Moreover satellite imagery appears to show the GBU-57s penetrated sites near to the enrichment hall’s ventilation and access tunnels. The bombs would have sent shockwaves through the mountain, probably damaging the centrifuges. They are highly sensitive to vibration when in use—and difficult to turn off without causing damage. On June 26th the IAEA’s director, Rafael Grossi, said the centrifuges were “no longer operational” after America’s strikes.
Image: Planet Labs
The Isfahan complex houses a variety of facilities, including centrifuge-production plants and sites that turn uranium into gaseous form, which allows it to be spun and enriched. Israeli strikes targeted parts of the site used for this purpose. America later struck the complex with Tomahawk cruise missiles. Isfahan also houses a storage facility for Iran’s stock of highly enriched uranium.
In May the IAEA estimated that Iran had 400kg of HEU, concentrated to 60% purity. This could be developed into weapons-grade uranium relatively quickly. The amount identified would be enough for about ten bombs.
The whereabouts and condition of this stock is unclear. In a series of social-media posts Jeffrey Lewis, an arms-control expert at the Middlebury Institute, noted neither America nor Israel appears to have targeted the underground storage facilities near Isfahan where much of it was stored. (Other independent analysis notes the Americans did target tunnel entrances.) Mr Lewis has also suggested that no strikes have hit another big underground site near Isfahan, where the Iranians produce centrifuges and potentially house other covert activities.
Iran may have moved the uranium. Trucks were seen at Isfahan and Fordow in the days before America’s attack. There have long been concerns that Iran was hoarding undeclared centrifuges and building other secret facilities, which could allow the clandestine resumption of the programme.
Still, dashing for a bomb would not be easy. The Iranians would have to turn the gaseous HEU back into a metallic form suitable for a bomb core, and many of the conversion facilities where this process would take place have been damaged. Meanwhile the task of “mating” a nuclear device with a projectile, such as a ballistic missile, is complex and could take substantial time. Israel’s intelligence agencies have deeply penetrated Iran’s nuclear efforts. If Israel suspects Iran is covertly working on nuclear weapons, the ceasefire between the rivals seems unlikely to hold. ■
American and Israeli strikes have done clear damage, but uncertainties remain about what has survived
Image: Getty Images
)
After America’s strikes on Iran on June 22nd, Donald Trump claimed that the country’s key nuclear facilities were “totally obliterated”. Other American officials were more cautious, noting that it would take time to assess the damage. Leaked preliminary intelligence reports suggest the attacks, which included the first use in battle of the GBU-57, America’s largest bunker-buster bomb, put Iran’s nuclear programme back by only a few months. The White House rejects the claims: on June 26th Pete Hegseth, America’s defence secretary, said the raid was “historically successful”, though he gave few details about the damage it inflicted. There is particular uncertainty about the amount of highly enriched uranium (HEU) Iran retains. Mapping Iran’s nuclear facilities gives a sense of the damage and how the country’s programme could endure.
Iran's nuclear facilities
Iran’s nuclear programme is distributed among several sites around the country, to make it harder to attack and disrupt.
The country has domestic sources of uranium. Its largest mine is at Saghand, in east-central Iran. But mined uranium is mostly the wrong type for nuclear weapons: it is over 99% uranium-238 (U-238; the number refers to the mass of each atom). Bombs require its lighter cousin, uranium-235 (U-235), which makes up just 0.7% of natural uranium.
To get at the lighter uranium, the metal is converted into a gas, uranium hexafluoride, and spun in centrifuges at extremely high speeds. The heavier U-238 tends to move to the outside, making the gas at the centre slightly richer in U-235. If this process is repeated many times, the concentration of U-235 can be raised as high as 90%, creating weapons-grade uranium.
Image: Planet Labs
The Natanz enrichment plant was Iran’s largest. An underground hall held around 18,400 centrifuges, according to the Institute for Science and International Security, a think-tank. The site also housed an above-ground centrifuge-research facility.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the UN’s nuclear watchdog, said Israeli strikes probably caused significant damage to centrifuges in Natanz’s underground facility by taking out their power supply. America also dropped two GBU-57s on the buried part of the site.
Image: Maxar
The underground enrichment facility at Fordow was the main target of the American attack. Its centrifuges, though fewer in number than Natanz, were newer and more robust. The most sensitive parts of the site were thought to be buried deep under the mountainside. Media reports suggest the American strikes badly damaged the facility’s electricity supply.
Moreover satellite imagery appears to show the GBU-57s penetrated sites near to the enrichment hall’s ventilation and access tunnels. The bombs would have sent shockwaves through the mountain, probably damaging the centrifuges. They are highly sensitive to vibration when in use—and difficult to turn off without causing damage. On June 26th the IAEA’s director, Rafael Grossi, said the centrifuges were “no longer operational” after America’s strikes.
Image: Planet Labs
The Isfahan complex houses a variety of facilities, including centrifuge-production plants and sites that turn uranium into gaseous form, which allows it to be spun and enriched. Israeli strikes targeted parts of the site used for this purpose. America later struck the complex with Tomahawk cruise missiles. Isfahan also houses a storage facility for Iran’s stock of highly enriched uranium.
In May the IAEA estimated that Iran had 400kg of HEU, concentrated to 60% purity. This could be developed into weapons-grade uranium relatively quickly. The amount identified would be enough for about ten bombs.
The whereabouts and condition of this stock is unclear. In a series of social-media posts Jeffrey Lewis, an arms-control expert at the Middlebury Institute, noted neither America nor Israel appears to have targeted the underground storage facilities near Isfahan where much of it was stored. (Other independent analysis notes the Americans did target tunnel entrances.) Mr Lewis has also suggested that no strikes have hit another big underground site near Isfahan, where the Iranians produce centrifuges and potentially house other covert activities.
Iran may have moved the uranium. Trucks were seen at Isfahan and Fordow in the days before America’s attack. There have long been concerns that Iran was hoarding undeclared centrifuges and building other secret facilities, which could allow the clandestine resumption of the programme.
Still, dashing for a bomb would not be easy. The Iranians would have to turn the gaseous HEU back into a metallic form suitable for a bomb core, and many of the conversion facilities where this process would take place have been damaged. Meanwhile the task of “mating” a nuclear device with a projectile, such as a ballistic missile, is complex and could take substantial time. Israel’s intelligence agencies have deeply penetrated Iran’s nuclear efforts. If Israel suspects Iran is covertly working on nuclear weapons, the ceasefire between the rivals seems unlikely to hold. ■
American and Israeli strikes have done clear damage, but uncertainties remain about what has survived
Image: Getty Images
)
After America’s strikes on Iran on June 22nd, Donald Trump claimed that the country’s key nuclear facilities were “totally obliterated”. Other American officials were more cautious, noting that it would take time to assess the damage. Leaked preliminary intelligence reports suggest the attacks, which included the first use in battle of the GBU-57, America’s largest bunker-buster bomb, put Iran’s nuclear programme back by only a few months. The White House rejects the claims: on June 26th Pete Hegseth, America’s defence secretary, said the raid was “historically successful”, though he gave few details about the damage it inflicted. There is particular uncertainty about the amount of highly enriched uranium (HEU) Iran retains. Mapping Iran’s nuclear facilities gives a sense of the damage and how the country’s programme could endure.
Iran's nuclear facilities
Iran’s nuclear programme is distributed among several sites around the country, to make it harder to attack and disrupt.
The country has domestic sources of uranium. Its largest mine is at Saghand, in east-central Iran. But mined uranium is mostly the wrong type for nuclear weapons: it is over 99% uranium-238 (U-238; the number refers to the mass of each atom). Bombs require its lighter cousin, uranium-235 (U-235), which makes up just 0.7% of natural uranium.
To get at the lighter uranium, the metal is converted into a gas, uranium hexafluoride, and spun in centrifuges at extremely high speeds. The heavier U-238 tends to move to the outside, making the gas at the centre slightly richer in U-235. If this process is repeated many times, the concentration of U-235 can be raised as high as 90%, creating weapons-grade uranium.
Image: Planet Labs
The Natanz enrichment plant was Iran’s largest. An underground hall held around 18,400 centrifuges, according to the Institute for Science and International Security, a think-tank. The site also housed an above-ground centrifuge-research facility.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the UN’s nuclear watchdog, said Israeli strikes probably caused significant damage to centrifuges in Natanz’s underground facility by taking out their power supply. America also dropped two GBU-57s on the buried part of the site.
Image: Maxar
The underground enrichment facility at Fordow was the main target of the American attack. Its centrifuges, though fewer in number than Natanz, were newer and more robust. The most sensitive parts of the site were thought to be buried deep under the mountainside. Media reports suggest the American strikes badly damaged the facility’s electricity supply.
Moreover satellite imagery appears to show the GBU-57s penetrated sites near to the enrichment hall’s ventilation and access tunnels. The bombs would have sent shockwaves through the mountain, probably damaging the centrifuges. They are highly sensitive to vibration when in use—and difficult to turn off without causing damage. On June 26th the IAEA’s director, Rafael Grossi, said the centrifuges were “no longer operational” after America’s strikes.
Image: Planet Labs
The Isfahan complex houses a variety of facilities, including centrifuge-production plants and sites that turn uranium into gaseous form, which allows it to be spun and enriched. Israeli strikes targeted parts of the site used for this purpose. America later struck the complex with Tomahawk cruise missiles. Isfahan also houses a storage facility for Iran’s stock of highly enriched uranium.
In May the IAEA estimated that Iran had 400kg of HEU, concentrated to 60% purity. This could be developed into weapons-grade uranium relatively quickly. The amount identified would be enough for about ten bombs.
The whereabouts and condition of this stock is unclear. In a series of social-media posts Jeffrey Lewis, an arms-control expert at the Middlebury Institute, noted neither America nor Israel appears to have targeted the underground storage facilities near Isfahan where much of it was stored. (Other independent analysis notes the Americans did target tunnel entrances.) Mr Lewis has also suggested that no strikes have hit another big underground site near Isfahan, where the Iranians produce centrifuges and potentially house other covert activities.
Iran may have moved the uranium. Trucks were seen at Isfahan and Fordow in the days before America’s attack. There have long been concerns that Iran was hoarding undeclared centrifuges and building other secret facilities, which could allow the clandestine resumption of the programme.
Still, dashing for a bomb would not be easy. The Iranians would have to turn the gaseous HEU back into a metallic form suitable for a bomb core, and many of the conversion facilities where this process would take place have been damaged. Meanwhile the task of “mating” a nuclear device with a projectile, such as a ballistic missile, is complex and could take substantial time. Israel’s intelligence agencies have deeply penetrated Iran’s nuclear efforts. If Israel suspects Iran is covertly working on nuclear weapons, the ceasefire between the rivals seems unlikely to hold. ■
American and Israeli strikes have done clear damage, but uncertainties remain about what has survived
Image: Getty Images
)
After America’s strikes on Iran on June 22nd, Donald Trump claimed that the country’s key nuclear facilities were “totally obliterated”. Other American officials were more cautious, noting that it would take time to assess the damage. Leaked preliminary intelligence reports suggest the attacks, which included the first use in battle of the GBU-57, America’s largest bunker-buster bomb, put Iran’s nuclear programme back by only a few months. The White House rejects the claims: on June 26th Pete Hegseth, America’s defence secretary, said the raid was “historically successful”, though he gave few details about the damage it inflicted. There is particular uncertainty about the amount of highly enriched uranium (HEU) Iran retains. Mapping Iran’s nuclear facilities gives a sense of the damage and how the country’s programme could endure.
Iran's nuclear facilities
Iran’s nuclear programme is distributed among several sites around the country, to make it harder to attack and disrupt.
The country has domestic sources of uranium. Its largest mine is at Saghand, in east-central Iran. But mined uranium is mostly the wrong type for nuclear weapons: it is over 99% uranium-238 (U-238; the number refers to the mass of each atom). Bombs require its lighter cousin, uranium-235 (U-235), which makes up just 0.7% of natural uranium.
To get at the lighter uranium, the metal is converted into a gas, uranium hexafluoride, and spun in centrifuges at extremely high speeds. The heavier U-238 tends to move to the outside, making the gas at the centre slightly richer in U-235. If this process is repeated many times, the concentration of U-235 can be raised as high as 90%, creating weapons-grade uranium.
Image: Planet Labs
The Natanz enrichment plant was Iran’s largest. An underground hall held around 18,400 centrifuges, according to the Institute for Science and International Security, a think-tank. The site also housed an above-ground centrifuge-research facility.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the UN’s nuclear watchdog, said Israeli strikes probably caused significant damage to centrifuges in Natanz’s underground facility by taking out their power supply. America also dropped two GBU-57s on the buried part of the site.
Image: Maxar
The underground enrichment facility at Fordow was the main target of the American attack. Its centrifuges, though fewer in number than Natanz, were newer and more robust. The most sensitive parts of the site were thought to be buried deep under the mountainside. Media reports suggest the American strikes badly damaged the facility’s electricity supply.
Moreover satellite imagery appears to show the GBU-57s penetrated sites near to the enrichment hall’s ventilation and access tunnels. The bombs would have sent shockwaves through the mountain, probably damaging the centrifuges. They are highly sensitive to vibration when in use—and difficult to turn off without causing damage. On June 26th the IAEA’s director, Rafael Grossi, said the centrifuges were “no longer operational” after America’s strikes.
Image: Planet Labs
The Isfahan complex houses a variety of facilities, including centrifuge-production plants and sites that turn uranium into gaseous form, which allows it to be spun and enriched. Israeli strikes targeted parts of the site used for this purpose. America later struck the complex with Tomahawk cruise missiles. Isfahan also houses a storage facility for Iran’s stock of highly enriched uranium.
In May the IAEA estimated that Iran had 400kg of HEU, concentrated to 60% purity. This could be developed into weapons-grade uranium relatively quickly. The amount identified would be enough for about ten bombs.
The whereabouts and condition of this stock is unclear. In a series of social-media posts Jeffrey Lewis, an arms-control expert at the Middlebury Institute, noted neither America nor Israel appears to have targeted the underground storage facilities near Isfahan where much of it was stored. (Other independent analysis notes the Americans did target tunnel entrances.) Mr Lewis has also suggested that no strikes have hit another big underground site near Isfahan, where the Iranians produce centrifuges and potentially house other covert activities.
Iran may have moved the uranium. Trucks were seen at Isfahan and Fordow in the days before America’s attack. There have long been concerns that Iran was hoarding undeclared centrifuges and building other secret facilities, which could allow the clandestine resumption of the programme.
Still, dashing for a bomb would not be easy. The Iranians would have to turn the gaseous HEU back into a metallic form suitable for a bomb core, and many of the conversion facilities where this process would take place have been damaged. Meanwhile the task of “mating” a nuclear device with a projectile, such as a ballistic missile, is complex and could take substantial time. Israel’s intelligence agencies have deeply penetrated Iran’s nuclear efforts. If Israel suspects Iran is covertly working on nuclear weapons, the ceasefire between the rivals seems unlikely to hold. ■
